Minimum Distance Estimation of Search Costs using Price Distribution by Sanches, F. et al.
              
City, University of London Institutional Repository
Citation: Sanches, F., Silva Junior, D. & Srisuma, S. (2016). Minimum Distance 
Estimation of Search Costs using Price Distribution. Journal of Business & Economic 
Statistics, doi: 10.1080/07350015.2016.1247003 
This is the accepted version of the paper. 
This version of the publication may differ from the final published 
version. 
Permanent repository link:  http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/16625/
Link to published version: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07350015.2016.1247003
Copyright and reuse: City Research Online aims to make research 
outputs of City, University of London available to a wider audience. 
Copyright and Moral Rights remain with the author(s) and/or copyright 
holders. URLs from City Research Online may be freely distributed and 
linked to.
City Research Online:            http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/            publications@city.ac.uk
City Research Online
Minimum Distance Estimation of Search Costs
using Price Distributiony
Fabio Sanches
University of São Paulo
Daniel Silva Junior
City University London
Sorawoot Srisuma
University of Surrey
September 9, 2016
Abstract
Hong and Shum (2006) show equilibrium restrictions in a search model can be used to
identify quantiles of the search cost distribution from observed prices alone. These quantiles
can be di¢ cult to estimate in practice. This paper uses a minimum distance approach to
estimate them that is easy to compute. A version of our estimator is a solution to a nonlinear
least squares problem that can be straightforwardly programmed on softwares such as STATA.
We show our estimator is consistent and has an asymptotic normal distribution. Its distribution
can be consistently estimated by a bootstrap. Our estimator can be used to estimate the cost
distribution nonparametrically on a larger support when prices from heterogeneous markets
are available. We propose a two-step sieve estimator for that case. The rst step estimates
quantiles from each market. They are used in the second step as generated variables to perform
nonparametric sieve estimation. We derive the uniform rate of convergence of the sieve estimator
that can be used to quantify the errors incurred from interpolating data across markets. To
illustrate we use online bookmaking odds for English football leaguesmatches (as prices) and
nd evidence that suggests search costs for consumers have fallen following a change in the
British law that allows gambling operators to advertise more widely.
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1 Introduction
Heterogenous search cost is one of the classic factors that can be used to rationalize price dispersion of
homogenous products. E.g., see the seminal work of Stigler (1964). Various empirical models of search
have been proposed and applied to numerous problems in economics depending on data availability.
Hong and Shum (2006, hereafter HS) show that search cost distributions can be identied from the
price data alone. The innovation of HS is very useful since price data are often readily available, for
instance in contrast to quantities of products supplied or demanded.
We consider an empirical search model with non-sequential search strategies. HS show the quan-
tiles of the search cost in such model can be estimated without specifying any parametric structure.
Although there has been more recent empirical works that extend the original idea of HS to estimate
more complicated models of search1, there are still interests in the identication and estimation of the
simpler search model nonparametrically. For examples, Moraga-González, Sándor and Wildenbeest
(2013) show how data from di¤erent markets can be used to identify the search cost distribution over
a larger support and Blevins and Senney (2014) consider a dynamic version of the search model we
consider here.
The main insight from HS is that the equilibrium condition can be summarized by an implicit
equation relating the price and its distribution, parameterized by the proportions of consumers
searching di¤erent number of sellers. The latter can be used to recover various quantiles of the
search cost distribution. Two main features of the equilibrium condition that lead to an interesting
econometric problem are: (i) it imposes a continuum of restrictions since the mixed strategy concept
leads to a continuous distribution of price in equilibrium; and, (ii) the observed price distribution is
only dened implicitly and cannot be solved out in terms of terms of price and the parameters of
interest.
In this paper we make two main methodological contributions that complement existing estima-
tion procedures and make the empirical search model more accessible to empirical researchers.
First, when there are data from a single market, we provide an estimator for the quantiles on
the cumulative distribution (cdf) of the search cost that is simple to construct and easy to perform
inference on. Our estimator uses all information imposed by the equilibrium condition. We show
under very weak conditions that our estimator is consistent and asymptotically normal at a para-
metric rate. We also show the distribution of our estimator can be approximated consistently by
a standard nonparametric bootstrap. The ease of practical use is the distinguishing feature of our
estimator compared to the existing ones in nontrivial ways. Its simplest version can be obtained by
1E.g. see Hortaçsu and Syverson (2004), De los Santos, Hortaçsu and Wildenbeest (2012), and Moraga-González,
Sándor and Wildenbeest (2012)).
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dening the distance function using the empirical measure that leads to a nonlinear least squares
problem that can be implemented on STATA.
Second, when there is access to data from multiple markets, we propose a two-step sieve estimator
that pools data across markets and estimate the cdf of the search cost as a function over a larger
support. Single market data can only be used to identify a limited number of quantiles. Our
sieve estimator provides a systematic way to combine quantiles from di¤erent individual markets.
Any estimator in the literature can be used in the rst stage, not necessarily the one we propose.
The second stage estimation resembles a nonparametric series estimation problem with generated
regressor and regressand. We provide the uniform rate of convergence for the sieve estimator. Since
we know the rate of convergence of quantiles from each individual market, the uniform rate using
pooled data can be used to quantify the cost of interpolation across markets.
For estimation HS takes a nite number of quantiles, each one to form a moment condition
using the equilibrium restriction written in terms of quantiles, and develop an empirical likelihood
estimator that has desirable theoretical properties such as e¢ ciency and small nite sample bias (e.g.
see Owens (2001) and Newey and Smith (2004)). However, a nite selection from innitely many
moment conditions may have implications in terms of consistent estimation and not just e¢ ciency
(Dominguez and Lobato (2004)). Some preliminary algebra suggests such issue may be relevant in the
model of search under consideration. But at the same time, with nite data, it is also not advisable
to use arbitrary many moment conditions for empirical likelihood estimation or any other optimal
GMM methods due to the numerical ill-posedness associated with e¢ cient moment estimation; see
the discussion in Carrasco and Florens (2002). Particularly, a well-known problem with the empirical
likelihood objective functions is they typically have many local minima, and the method is generally
challenging to program and implement; see Section 8 in Kitamura (2007). Indeed HS also report some
numerical di¢ culties in their numerical work; in their illustration they choose the largest number of
quantiles that allow their optimization routine to converge.2
Partly motivated by the numerical issues associated with HSs approach, Moraga-González and
Wildenbeest (2007, hereafter MGW) propose an inventive way to construct the maximum likelihood
estimator by manipulating the equilibrium restriction. They suggest the likelihood procedure is easier
to compute and, importantly, is also e¢ cient. However, the numerical aspect in terms of the imple-
mentation of their estimator remains non trivial. The di¢ culty is due to the fact that the probability
density function (pdf) of the price is dened implicitly in terms of its cdf, the latter in turns is only
known as a solution of a nonlinear equation imposed by the equilibrium. This leads to a constrained
likelihood estimation problem with many nonlinear constraints. A naïve programming approach to
2Hong and Shum (2006) illustrate their procedure using online price data of some well-known economics and
statistics textbooks.
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this optimization problem is to directly specify a nested procedure requiring an optimization routine
on both the inner and outer loop, where the inner step searches over the parameter space and the
outer step solves the nonlinear constraints. A more numerically e¢ cient alternative may be possible
by using constrained optimization solvers with algorithms that deal with the nonlinear constraints
endogenously. See Su and Judd (2012) for a related discussion and further references.3
We take a di¤erent approach that is closely related to the asymptotic least squares estimation
described in Chapter 9 of Gourieroux and Monfort (1995). Asymptotic least squares method, which
can be viewed as an alternative representation to the familiar method of moment estimator, is partic-
ularly suited to estimate structural models as the objective functions can often be written to represent
the equilibrium condition directly. For examples see the least squares estimators of Pesendorfer and
Schmidt-Dengler (2008) and Sanches, Silva Junior and Srisuma (2016) in the context of dynamic
discrete games.4 However, the statistical theory required to derive the asymptotic properties of our
estimator in this paper is more complicated than those used in the dynamic discrete games cited
above since here we have to deal with a continuum of restrictions instead of a nite number of restric-
tions. We derive our large sample results using a similar strategy employed in Brown and Wegkamp
(2002), who utilize tools from empirical process theory to derive analogous large sample results for
a di¤erent minimum distance estimator.5
The estimator we propose focuses on the ease of practical use but not e¢ ciency. There are at
least two obvious ways to improve on the asymptotic variance of our estimator. As alluded above,
the equilibrium restriction can also be stated as a continuum of moment conditions. Therefore
an e¢ cient estimation in the GMM sense can be pursued by solving an ill-posed inverse problem
along the line of Carrasco and Florens (2000).6 It is arguably even simpler to aim for the fully
e¢ cient estimator. For instance we can perform a Newton Raphson iteration once, starting from our
easy compute estimate, using the Hessian from the likelihood based objective function proposed by
MGW. Then such estimator will have the same rst order asymptotic distribution as the maximum
likelihood estimator (Robinson (1988)). But, of course, there is no guarantee the asymptotically
e¢ cient estimator will perform better than the less e¢ cient one in nite sample.
3An important feature for the search model under consideration is that the number of constraints is large and
grows with sample size, while many other well-known structural models, such as those associated with dynamic
discrete decision problems and games, have a xed and relatively small number of constraints.
4Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008) also illustrate how a moment estimator can be cast as an asymptotic
least squares estimator.
5They consider a minimum distance estimator dened from a criterion based on a conditional independence condi-
tion due to Manski (1983).
6Also see a recent working paper of Chaussé (2011), who is extending the estimator of Carrasco and Florens (2000)
to a generalized empirical likelihood setting.
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When the data come from a single market, an inevitable limitation of the identifying strategy
in HS is that only countable points of the distribution of the search cost can be identied. Partic-
ularly there is only one accumulation point at the lower support of the cost distribution. In order
to identify higher quantiles of the cost distribution, and possibly its full support, Moraga-González,
Sándor and Wildenbeest (2013) suggest combining data from di¤erent markets where consumers have
the same underlying search distribution. In particular they provide conditions under which pooling
data sets can be used for identication. In terms of estimation they suggest that interpolating data
between markets can be di¢ cult. In order to overcome this, they propose a semi-nonparametric
maximum likelihood estimator for the pdf of the search cost. The cdf, which is often a more conve-
nient object to make stochastic comparisons, can then be obtained by integration. However, their
semi-nonparametric maximum likelihood procedure is complicated as it solves a highly nonlinear
optimization problem with many parameters. They show their estimator can consistently estimate
the distribution of the search cost where the support is identied but do not provide the convergence
rate.7
Building on the semi-nonparametric idea, we propose a two-step sieve least squares estimator for
the cdf of the search cost. The estimation problem involved can also be seen as an asymptotic least
squares problem where the parameter of interest is an innite dimensional object instead of a nite
dimensional one. We show that sieve estimation is a convenient way to systematically combine data
from di¤erent markets. It can be used in conjunction with any aforementioned estimation method,
not necessarily with the minimum distance estimator we propose in this paper. In the rst stage
an estimation procedure is performed for each individual market. In the second stage we use the
rst-step estimators as generated variables and perform sieve least squares estimation. Our sieve
estimator is easy to compute as it only involves ordinary least squares estimation. We provide the
uniform rate of convergence for our estimator. The ability to derive uniform rate of convergence is
important as it gives us a guidance on the cost of estimation the entire function compared to at just
some nite points, which we know to converge at a parametric rate within each market.
The large sample properties of our sieve estimator are not immediately trivial to verify. In prac-
tice our second stage least squares procedure resembles that of a nonparametric regression problem
with generated regressors and generated regressands. There has been much recent interest in the
econometrics and statistics literature on the general theory of estimation problems involving gen-
erated regressors in the nonparametric regression context (e.g., see Escanciano, Jacho-Chávez and
Lewbel (2012, 2014) and Mammen, Rothe and Schienle (2012, 2014)). Problems with generated vari-
ables on both sides of the equation seem less common. Furthermore, the asymptotic least squares
7Details can be found in the supplementary materials to Moraga-González, Sándor and Wildenbeest (2013), avail-
able at, http://qed.econ.queensu.ca/jae/2013-v28.7/moraga-gonzalez-sander-wildenbeest/.
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framework generally di¤ers from a regression model. We are not aware of any general results for
an asymptotic least squares estimation of an innite dimensional object. However, our problem is
somewhat simpler to handle relative to the cited works above since our generated variables converge
at the parametric rate rather than nonparametric. We derive the properties for our sieve estimator
under the framework that the data have a pooled cross section structure. Our approach to derive the
uniform rate of convergence is general and can be used in other asymptotic least squares problems.
We conduct a small scale Monte Carlo experiment to compare our proposed estimators with other
estimators in the literature. Then we illustrate our procedures using real world data. We estimate the
search costs using online odds, to construct prices, for English football leagues matches in the 2006/7
and 2007/8 seasons. There is an interesting distinction between the two seasons that follows from
the United Kingdom (UK) passing of a well-known legistration that allows bookmakers to advertise
more freely after the 2006/7 season has ended. We consider the top two English football leagues: the
Premier League (top division) and the League Championship (2nd division). We treat the odds for
matches from each league as coming from di¤erent markets. We nd that the search costs generally
have fallen following the change in the law as expected.
We present the model in Section 2, and then we dene our estimator and briey discuss its relation
to existing estimators in the literature. Section 3 gives the large sample theorems for our estimator
that uses data from a single market. Section 4 assumes we have data from di¤erent markets; we
dene our sieve estimator for the cdf of the search cost and give its uniform rate of convergence.
Section 5 is the numerical section containing a simulation study and empirical illustrations. Section
6 concludes. All proofs can be found in the Appendix.
2 Model, Equilibrium Restrictions and Estimation
The empirical model in HS relies on theoretical result of Burdett and Judd (1983). The model
assumes there are continuums of consumers and sellers. Consumers are heterogenous, di¤ering by
search costs drawn from some continuous distribution with a cdf, G. Sellers have identical marginal
cost, r, and sell the same product; they only di¤er by the price they set. Each consumer has an
inelastic demand for one unit of the product with the valuation of p. Since search is costly, her
optimal strategy is to visit the smallest number of sellers given her beliefs on the price distribution
sellers use. In a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium each seller sets a price that maximizes its
expected prot given the consumers search strategies, and the distribution of prices set by the
sellers is consistent with the consumersbeliefs. Since the number of sellers observed in the data
is often small we assume there are K < 1 sellers. An equilibrium continuous price distribution,
as the symmetric equilibrium strategy employed by all rms, is known to exist for a given set of
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primitives (G; p; r;K); see Moraga-González, Sándor and Wildenbeest (2010). We denote the cdf
of the equilibrium price distribution by F . The constancy of the sellers equilibrium prot is our
starting point:
 (p; r) = (p  r)
KX
k=1
kqk (1  F (p))k 1 s.t.  (p; r) =  (p0; r) for all p; p0 2 SP ; (1)
where SP =

p; p

is the support of Pi for some 0 < p < p <1, and qk is the equilibrium proportion
of consumer searching k times for 1  k  K. Once fqkgKk=1 are known, they can be used to recover
the quantiles of the search cost distribution from the identity:
qk =
8>><>>:
1 G (1) ;
G (k 1) G (k) ;
G (K 1) ;
for k = 1
for k = 2; : : : ; K   1
for k = K
; (2)
wherek = E [P1:k] E [P1:k+1] and E [P1:k] denotes the expected minimum price from drawing prices
from k  i.i.d. sellers, which is identied from the data. For further details and discussions regarding
the model we refer the reader to HS, MGW and also Moraga-González, Sándor and Wildenbeest
(2010).
The econometric problem of interest in this and the next sections is to rst estimate fqkgKk=1 from
observing a random sample of equilibrium prices fPigNi=1, and then use them to recover identied
points of the search cost distribution: f(k; G (k))gK 1k=1 . First note that we can concentrate out
the marginal cost by equating  (p; r) and 
 
p; r

,
r (q) =
pq1   p
PK
k=1 kqk
q1  
PK
k=1 kqk
: (3)
Following HS, the equilibrium condition for the purpose of estimation can be obtained from equating
from  (p; r) =  (p; r) for all p. In particular, this relation can be written as
p = r (q) +
(p  r (q)) q1PK
k=1 kqk (1  F (p))k 1
for all p 2 SP : (4)
Before we introduce our estimator we now briey explain how the equations above have been used
for estimation in the literature.
Empirical Likelihood (Hong and Shum (2006))
Since Pi has a continuous distribution the inverse of F , denoted by F 1, exists so that p =
F 1 (F (p)) for all p. Note that equation (4) is equivalent to
F (p) = F
 
r (q) +
(p  r (q)) q1PK
k=1 kqk (1  F (p))k 1
!
:
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Then choose nite V quantile points, fslgVl=1, so that sl 2 [0; 1] is the sl-th quantile. HS develop an
empirical likelihood estimator of q based on the following V moment conditions:
h (q; sl) = E
"
sl   1
"
Pi  r (q) + (p  r (q)) q1PK
k=1 kqk (1  sl)k 1
##
for l = 1; : : : ; V ,
where 1 [] denotes an indicator function. Clearly one needs to choose V  K   1, where the minus
one comes from the restriction
PK
k=1 qk = 1.
In theory we would like to choose as many moment conditions as possible. However, there are
practical costs and implementation issues in nite sample as explained in the Introduction. At the
same time, in principle, choosing too few moment conditions can lead to an identication problem.
We illustrate the latter point in the spirit of the illustrating examples in Dominguez and Lobato
(2004).
Suppose K = 2, and we use q2 = 1   q1, so r (q) = pq1 p(q1+2(1 q1)) 2(1 q1) . For any s0 2 [0; 1], the
moment condition becomes:
E
"
s0   1
"
Pi  (p  r) q1
q1 + 2 (1  q1) (1  s0)  
 
p  p q1   2p (1  q1)
2 (1  q1)
##
,
then for some p0 that satises s0 = F (p0), q1 must satisfy
p0 =

p+
pq1 p(q1+2(1 q1))
2(1 q1)

q1
q1 + 2 (1  q1) (1  F (p0))  
 
p  p q1   2p (1  q1)
2 (1  q1) :
By multiplying the denominators across and re-arranging the equation above, by inspection, it is
easy to see we have an implicit function T (q1; p0; F (p0)) = 0 such that, for every pair (p0; F (p0)),
T (q1; p0; F (p0)) is a quadratic function of q1. However this suggests there are potentially two distinct
values for q1 that satisfy the same moment condition for a given s0, in which case it may not be
possible give have a consistent estimator for q1 based on one particular quantile.
More generally, when K > 2, each sl leads to an equation for a general ellipse in RK 1 whose level
set at zero can represent the values of proportions of consumers that satisfy the moment condition
associated with each quantile level sl.8 Therefore, with any estimator based on (4), one may be
inclined to incorporate all conditions for the purpose of consistent estimation.
Maximum Likelihood (Moraga-González and Wildenbeest (2007))
Let the derivative of F , i.e. the pdf, by f . By di¤erentiating equation (4) and solve out for f ,
the implicit function theorem yields:
f (p) =
PK
k=1 kqk (1  F (p))k 1
(p  r (q))PKk=2 k (k   1) qk (1  F (p))k 2 for all p 2 SP : (5)
8A natural restriction for a proportion can be used to rule out any complex value as well as other reals outside
[0; 1].
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MGW suggest a maximum likelihood procedure based on maximizing, with respect to q, the following
likelihood function:
ef (q; p) = PKk=1 kqk

1  eF (q; p)k 1
(p  r (q))PKk=2 k (k   1) qk 1  eF (q; p)k 2 for p 2 SP ; (6)
where eF (q; p) is restricted to satisfy equation (4). In practice supposed the observed prices are
fPigNi=1. Then for each candidate q0, and each i, eF (q0;Pi) can be chosen to satisfy the equilibrium
restriction by imposing that it solves: 0 = Pi   r (q0)   (p r(q
0))q01PK
k=1 kq
0
k(1  eF (q0;Pi))k 1 . However, it may not
be a trivial numerical task to fully respect equation (4). Particularly eF (q0;Pi) generally does not
have a closed-form expression and is only known to be a root of some (K   1) th order polynomial.
Such polynomial always have multiple roots. The multiplicity issue can be migitated by imposing
constraints that eF (q0;Pi) must be real and take values between 0 and 1, and it must be non-
decreasing in Pi.
Minimum Distance
We propose to use the equilibrium condition directly to dene objective functions, rather than
posing it as (a continuum of) moment conditions. In particular, in contrast to HS, we use equation (4)
without passing the equilibrium restriction through the function F . This approach can be seen as a
generalization of the asymptotic least squares estimator described in Gourieroux and Monfort (1995)
when there is a continuum of restrictions. It will be also convenient to eliminate the denominators
to rule out any possibilities of division near zero that may occur if q1 is close to 0 and p approaches
1. We rst substituting in for r (q), from (3), then equation (4) can be simplied to: 
KX
k=1
kqk (1  F (p))k 1
! 
(p  p) q1  
 
p  p KX
k=1
kqk
!
= q1
  
p  p KX
k=1
kqk
!
:
Next we concentrate out qK in the above equation by replacing it with 1 
PK 1
k=1 qk, which leads to
the following restriction:
0 = q1
  
p  p K   K 1X
k=1
(k  K) qk
!!
(7)
 
0@ K 1 PK 1k=1 qk (1  F (p))K 1
+
PK 1
k=1 kqk (1  F (p))k 1
1A (p  p) q1    p  p K   K 1X
k=1
(k  K) qk
!!
:
this must hold for all p 2 SP .
Note that the equation above can be re-written as a polynomial in q K  (q1; : : : ; qK 1), which
is always smooth independently of F . In contrast to the moment condition considered in HS that
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has q as an argument of the unknown function F ; using the empirical cdf to construct the objective
function in the latter case introduces non-smoothness in the estimation problem.
3 Estimation with Data from a Single Market
We use the equilibrium restiction (7) to dene an econometric model fm (; )g2 so that m (; ) :
SP ! R, where for all p 2 SP :
m (p; ) = 1
  
p  p K   K 1X
k=1
(k  K) k
!!
(8)
 
0@ K 1 PK 1k=1 k (1  F (p))K 1
+
PK 1
k=1 k (1  F (p))k 1
1A (p  p) 1    p  p K   K 1X
k=1
(k  K) k
!!
;
and  = (1; : : : ; K 1) is an element in the parameter space  = [0; 1]
K 1. We assume the model is
well-specied so that m (p; ) = 0 for all p 2 SP when  equals q K . Given a sample fPigNi=1, we
dene the empirical cdf as:
FN (p) =
1
N
NX
i=1
1 [Pi  p] for all p 2 SP :
We then dene mN (p; ) as the sample counterpart of m (p; ) where F is replaced by FN . And we
propose a minimum distance estimator based on
min
2
Z
(mN (p; ))
2 N (dp) ;
where N is a sequence of positive and nite, possibly random, measures.
We now dene respectively the limiting and sample objective functions, and our estimator:
MN () =
Z
(mN (p; ))
2 N (dp) ;
M () =
Z
(m (p; ))2  (dp) ;
b = arg min
2
MN () :
We shall denote the probability measure for the observed data by P, and the probability measure
for the bootstrap sample conditional on fPigNi=1 by P. In what follows we use a:s:!;
p! and d! to
denote convergence almost surely, in probability, and in distribution respectively, with respect to P
as N ! 1. We let a:s:! ; p! denote convergence almost surely and in probability respectively, with
respect to P.
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We adopt the same data generating environment as in HS and MGW.
Assumption A1. fPigNi=1 is an i.i.d. sequence of continuous random variables with bounded pdf
whose cdf satises the equilibrium condition in (4).
Let 0 denote q K . We now provide conditions for our estimator to be consistent and asymptot-
ically normal.
Assumption A2. (i) m (Pi; ) = 0 almost surely if and only if  = 0; (ii) N almost surely
converges weakly to a non-random nite measure  that dominates the distribution of Pi;9 (iii)R
@
@
m (p; 0)
@
@>m (p; 0) (dp) is invertible.
A2(i) is the point-identication assumption on the equilibrium condition. It is generally di¢ cult
to provide a more primitive condition for identication in a general nonlinear system of equations, e.g.
see the results in Komunjer (2012) for a parametric model with nite unconditional moments. Our
equilibrium condition presents a continuum of identifying restrictions. A2(ii) allows us to construct
objective functions using random measures or otherwise, the domination condition ensures identi-
cation of 0 is preserved. Examples for measures that satisfy A2(ii) include the uniform measure on
SP , in this case N =  for all N , and a natural candidate for a random measure is the empirical
measure from the observed data. For the latter, weak convergence is ensured if the class of functions
under consideration is  Glivenko-Cantelli, which can be veried using the methods discussed in
Andrews (1994) and Kosorok (2008). A2(iii) assumes the usual local positive deniteness condition
that follows from the Taylor expansion of the derivative of M around 0.
Theorem 1 (Consistency). Under Assumptions A1, A2(i) and A2(ii), b a:s:! 0.
Theorem 2 (Asymptotic Normality). Under Assumption A1 and A2,
p
N
b   0 d! N  0; H 1H 1 ; such that
 = Var

2
Z
 (p)B (F (p)) (dp)

; (9)
H = 2
Z
@
@
m (p; 0)
@
@>
m (p; 0) (dp) ; (10)
where B (F (p)) and  (p) are dened in the Appendix (see equations (16) and (19) respectively).
Given the regular nature of our criterion function, we obtain a root N consistency result as
expected. The asymptotic variance of b can be consistently estimated using its sample counterparts.
9Let D be a space of bounded functions dened on SP . We say N almost surely converges weakly to a 
if
R
' (p)N (dp) 
R
' (p) (dp)
a:s:! 0 for every ' 2 D.
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But this can be a cumbersome task. Specically, although H is relatively easy to estimate,  requires
estimating moments involving (a functional of) a Brownian bridge. Perhaps a more convenient
method for inference can be performed base on resampling. Our next result shows the ordinary
nonparametric bootstrap can be used to imitate the distribution of b stated in Theorem 2.
Let fP i gNi=1 denote a random sample drawn from the empirical distribution from fPigNi=1. For
some positive and nite measure N , let M

N () =
R
(mN (p; ))
2 N (dp), where m

N (p; ) is dened
in the same way as mN (p; ) but based on the bootstrap sample instead of the original data set. We
can then construct a minimum distance estimator using the bootstrap sample:
b = arg min
2
MN () : (11)
In addition we require is that N has to be chosen in a similar manner to N . The following statements
are made conditioning on fPigNi=1.
Assumption A3. N almost surely converges weakly to N .
A3, as with A2(ii), is not necessary for nonrandom measures (cf. Brown and Wegkamp (2002)).
However, it ensures the validity of a fully automated resampling process for instance when the
empirical measure is use for N and 

N , with respect to the observed and resampled data.
Theorem 3 (Bootstrap Consistency). Under Assumptions A1 to A3,
p
N
b   b converges in
distribution to N (0; H 1H 1) in probability.
Theorem 3 ensures that nonparametric bootstrap can be used to consistently estimate the distri-
bution of
p
N
b   0. Subsequently we can perform inference on 0 via bootstrapping.
By construction b is the estimator for q K . Then a natural estimator for qK is bK  1 PK 1k=1 bk.
The large sample properties of bK and the ability to bootstrap its distribution follow immediately
from applications of various versions of the continuous mapping theorem.
Corollary 1 (Large Sample Properties of bK). Under Assumptions A1 and A2: (i) bK a:s:! qK;
(ii) for some real K > 0:
p
N
bK   qK d! N (0; 2K); and with the addition of Assumption A3,
let bK = 1 PK 1k=1 bk where b is dened as in (11), then pN bK   bK converges in distribution
to N (0; 2K) in probability.
We state our Corollary 1, and subsequent Corollaries, without proof. The consistency result
follows from Slutzkys theorem. The distribution theory can be obtained by the delta-method. Fi-
nally, the consistency of the bootstrap follows from the continuous mapping theorem. The validity of
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these smooth transformation results are standard, e.g. see Kosorok (2008). Although the asymptotic
variances in all three Corollaries can be consistently bootstrapped, for completeness, we also provide
their explicit forms in the Appendix.
We next turn to the distribution theory for the estimators of fkgK 1k=1 and fG (k)gK 1k=1 . Recall
that k = E [P1:k] E [P1:k+1], so one candidate estimator for k is simply its empirical counterpart.
Alternatively, in order to apply the same type of argument used for Corollary 1, we will employ an
alternate identity for k that can be obtained from an integration by parts as shown in MGW (see
equations (7) and (8) in their paper):
k =
Z 1
z=0
w (z; q) [(k + 1) z   1] (1  z)k 1 dz; for k = 1; : : : ; K   1 where (12)
w (z; q) =
q1 (p  r (q))PK
k0=1 k
0qk0 (1  z)k0 1
+ r (q) , for z 2 [0; 1] .
In what follows we dene bk as the feasible version of k in the above display where w (; q) is
replaced by w(;b), and with bK in place of qK . Therefore bk is necessarily a smooth function of b.
For fG (k)gK 1k=1 , simple manipulation of equation (2) leads to:
G(1) = 1  q1; (13)
G(2) = 1  q1   q2;
... =
...
G(K 1) = 1  q1   : : :  qK 1:
The above system of equations can also be found in HS (equation A6, pp. 273). We dene bG (k)
by replacing q by b, which is also a smooth function of b. Therefore the consistency and asymptotic
distribution, as well as validity of the bootstrap, for fbkgK 1k=1 and f bG(k)gK 1k=1 immediately follow.
Corollary 2 (Large Sample Properties of fbkgK 1k=1 ). Under Assumptions A1 and A2: (i)bk a:s:! k for all k = 1; : : : ; K   1; (ii) for some positive denite matrix 
:
p
N
 b   pN
0BB@
b1  1
...bK 1  K 1
1CCA d! N (0;
) ;
and with the addition of Assumption A3, let fbkgK 1k=1 be dened using equation (12) where w (z; q)
is replaced by w(z;b) and b is dened in (11), then pN  b   b converges in distribution to
N (0;
) in probability.
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Corollary 3 (Large Sample Properties of f bG (k)gK 1k=1 ). Under Assumptions A1 and A2: (i)bG (k) a:s:! G (k) for all k = 1; : : : ; K   1; (ii) for some positive denite matrix 
G:
p
N
bG G  pN
0BB@
bG(1) G (1)
...bG (K 1) G (K 1)
1CCA d! N (0;
G) ;
and with the addition of Assumption A3, let f bG (k)gK 1k=1 be dened using equation (13) where  is
replaced by b, which is dened in (11), then pN bG   bG converges in distribution to N (0;
G)
in probability.
4 Pooling Data from Multiple Markets
In this section we show how data from di¤erent markets can be combined to estimate G. When
the data come from a single market, we can only identify and estimate the cost distribution at
nite cut-o¤ points, f(k; G (k))gK 1k=1 , since there is only a nite number of sellers that consumers
can search from (see Proposition 1 in Moraga-González, Sándor and Wildenbeest (2013, hereafter
MGSW)). Even if we allow the number of rms to be innite, since k is decreasing in k and
accumulates at zero, we would still not be able to identify any part of the cost distribution above
1 (see the discussion in HS). One solution is to look across heterogenous markets. Proposition 2 in
MGSW provides a su¢ cient set of conditions for the identication of G over a larger part, or possibly
all, of its support based on using the data from di¤erent markets that are generated by consumers
who endow the same search cost distribution of consumers but may di¤er in their valuations of the
product, and the number of sellers and pricing strategy may also di¤er across markets.
MGSW suggest a semi-nonparametric method based on maximum likelihood estimation to esti-
mate the cost distribution in one piece instead of combining di¤erent estimates of G across markets
in some ad hoc fashion.10 However, it is also quite simple to use estimates from individual markets
to estimate G nonparametrically in a systematic manner. Here we describe one method based on
using a sieve in conjunction with a simple least squares criterion.
Suppose there are T independent markets, where for each t we observe a random sample of
prices fP ti gN
t
i=1 with a common distribution described by a cdf F
t that is generated from the prim-
itive (G; pt; rt; Kt). For each market t we can rst estimate fqtkgK
t
k=1 and use equation (2) to es-
timate fG (tk)gK
t
k=1, where fqtkgK
t
k=1 and ftkgK
t
k=1 are the equilibrium proportions of search and
the corresponding cut-o¤ points in the cost distribution. Proposition 2 in MGSW provides con-
ditions where G can be identied on SC =

C;C

, where C = limT!1 inf1tT t1  1 and
10They actually estimate the pdf of the search cost. It is then integrated to get the cdf.
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C = limT!1 sup1tT 
t
1  1. In particular the degree of heterogeneity across di¤erent markets
determines how close SC is to the full support of the cost distribution.
Recall from (13) that each G (tk) is expressed only in terms of fqtkgK
t
k=1, particularly for each t
we have:
G(t1) = 1  qt1; (14)
G(t2) = 1  qt1   qt2;
... =
...
G(tKt 1) = 1  qt1   : : :  qtKt 1:
We dene the squared Euclidean norm of the discrepancies for this vector of equations when G is
replaced by any generic function g that belongs to some space of functions G by:
 t
 
Wt; g

=
Kt 1X
k=1
  
1 
kX
k0=1
qtk0
!
  g(tk)
!2
;
where Wt = (qt1; : : : ; q
t
Kt 1;
t
1; : : : ;
t
Kt 1). By construction  
t (Wt; G) = 0. We can then combine
these functions across all markets and dene:
	T (g) =
1
T
TX
t=1
 t
 
Wt; g

: (15)
The key identifying condition for us is that 	T (G) = 0. There are other distances that one can
choose to dene  t, and also di¤erent ways to combine them across markets. We choose this particular
functional form of the loss function for its simplicity. Particularly 	T is just a sum of squares criterion
that is similar to those studied in the series nonparametric regression literature (e.g. see Andrews
(1991) and Newey (1997)) when
n
1 Pkk0=1 qtk0oKt 1;T
k=1;t=1
and ftkgK
t 1;T
k=1;t=1 are treated as regressands
and regressors respectively. By using series approximation to estimate G our estimator is an example
of a general sieve least squares estimator. An extensive survey on sieve estimation can be found in
Chen (2007).
Before proceeding further we introduce some additional notations. For any positive semi-denite
real matrix A we let  (A) and  (A) denote respectively the minimal and maximal eigenvalues of
A. For any matrix A, we denote the spectral norm by kAk =   A>A1=2, and its Moore-Penrose
pseudo-inverse by A . We let G to denote some space of real-valued function dened on SC . We
denote sieves by fGTgT1, where GT  GT+1  G for any integer T . For any function g in GT ,
or in G, we let jgj1 = supc2SC jg (c)j. For random real matrices VN and positive numbers bN , with
N  1, we dene VN = Op (bN) as lim&!1 lim supn!1 Pr [kVNk > &bN ] = 0, and dene VN = op (bN)
as limN!1 Pr [kVNk > &bN ] = 0 for any & > 0. For any two sequences of positive numbers b1N and
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b2N , the notation b1N  b2N means that the ratio b1N=b2N is bounded below and above by positive
constants that are independent of n.
Sieve Least Squares Estimation
We start with the infeasible problem where we assume to know fWtgTt=1. We estimate G
on SC using a sequence of basis functions fglLgLl=1 that span GT , where glL : SC ! R for all
l = 1; : : : ; L with L being an increasing integer in T , and L is short for L(T ). We use gL (c) to denote
(g1L (c) ; : : : ; gLL (c))
> for any c 2 SC , and g =
 
gL (11) ; : : : ; g
L
 
1K1 1

; : : : ; gL
 
T1

; : : : ; gL
 
TKt 1
>
.
Let  denote a
PT
t=1 (K
t   1) vector of ones, and y =  

q11; : : : ;
PK1 1
k=1 q
1
k; : : : ; q
T
1 ; : : : ;
PKT 1
k=1 q
T
k
>
.
Then the least squares coe¢ cient from minimizing the sieve objective function is:
e =  g>g  g>y:
We denote our infeasible sieve estimator for G by eG, where
eG (c) = gL (c)> e:
However, we do not observe fWtgTt=1. Our feasible sieve estimator can be constructed in two steps.
 First step: use the estimator proposed in the previous section we obtaincWt = (bqt1; : : : ; bqtKt 1; bt1;
: : : ; btKt 1) for every t.
 Second step: replace (g;y) by (bg; by) where the latter quantities are constructed using fcWtgTt=1
instead of fWtgTt=1. We dene our sieve least squares estimator by:
bG (c) = gL (c)> b; whereb =  bg>bg  bg>by.
Numerically our feasible estimation problem is identical to the estimator from a nonparametric
series estimation of a regression function when the regressors and regressands used are based on
fcWtgTt=1. Notice, however, our sieve estimator is fundamentally di¤erent to a series estimator of a
regression function since we have no regression error and the only source of sampling error (variance)
comes from the generated variables we obtain from individual market in the rst step.
We now state some assumptions that are su¢ cient for us to derive the uniform rate of convergence
of bG.
Assumption B1. (i) For all t = 1; : : : ; T , Pt = fP ti gN
t
i=1 is an i.i.d. sequence of N
t random
variables whose distribution satises the equilibrium condition in (4), where (F t; pt; rt; Kt) is market
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specic; (ii) Pt and Pt
0
are independent for any t 6= t0; (iii) The analog of Assumption A2 holds for
all markets.
Assumptions B1(i) and B1(iii) ensure that
cWt  Wt = Op 1=pN t for all t as N t !1. We
impose independence in B1(ii) between markets for simplicity. In principles the recent conditions
employed in Lee and Robinson (2014) to derive the uniform rates of series estimator under a weak
form of cross sectional dependence can also be applied to our estimator.
Assumption B2. (i) fKtgTt=1 is an i.i.d. sequence with some discrete distribution with support
K =

2; : : : ; K
	
for some K <1; (ii) ftgTt=1 is an independent sequence of random vectors such
that t =
 
t1; : : : ;
t
Kt 1

is a decreasing sequence of reals, where each variable has a continuous
marginal distribution dened on SC for all t. Furthermore, for any t 6= t0 such that Kt = Kt0, tk
and t
0
k have identical distribution.
Assumption B2 consists of conditions on the data generating process that ensure any open interval
in SC is visited innitely often by ftgTt=1 as T !1. This allows the repeated observations of data
across markets to nonparametrically identify G on SC . Note that the size of t is random since
Kt is a random variable, so that ftgTt=1 (and thus fWtgTt=1) is an i.i.d. sequence. On the other
hand, conditional on fKtgTt=1, ftgTt=1 is an independent sequence but it does not have an identical
distribution across t. In addition tk and 
t
k0 are neither independent nor have identical distribution
for a given t. Therefore ftkgK
t 1;T
k=1;t=1 is a K dependent process due to the independence across t.
Assumption B3. (i) For K = 2; : : : ; K,
min
1kK


E
h
gL
 
tk

gL
 
tk
> jKt = Ki > 0; and
max
1kK


E
h
gL
 
tk

gL
 
tk
> jKt = Ki < 1;
(ii) There exists a deterministic function  (L) satisfying supc2SC
gL (c)   (L) for all L such that
 (L)4 L2=T ! 0 as T ! 1; (iii) For all L there exists a sequence L = (1; : : : ; L) 2 RL and
some  > 0 such that G  gL>L1 = O  L  :
Assumption B3 consists of familiar conditions from the literature on nonparametric series estima-
tion of regression functions, e.g. see Andrews (1991) and Newey (1997). B3(i) implies that redundant
bases are ruled out, and that the second moment matrices are uniformly bounded away from zero
and innity for any distribution of tk under consideration. The bounding of the moments from
above and below is also imposed in Andrews (1991), who consider independent but not identically
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distributed sequence of random variables. Assumption B3(ii) controls the magnitude of the series
terms. Since G is bounded, the bases can be chosen to be bounded and non-vanishing in which case
it is easy to see from the denition of the norm that  (L) = O(
p
L). Some examples for other rates
of  (L), such as those of orthogonal polynomials or B-splines can be found in Newey (1997, Sections
5 and 6 respectively). Assumption B3(iii) quanties the uniform error bounds for the approximation
functions. For example if G is s times continuously di¤erentiable and the chosen sieves are splines
or polynomials, then it can be shown  = s.
Assumption B4. For the same  (L) as in B3(ii): (i) for all L and l = 1; : : : ; L, glL 2
GT is continuously di¤erentiable and supc2SC
@gL (c)   (L) for all L, and @gL (c) denotes 
d
dc
g1L (c) ; : : : ;
d
dc
gLL (c)
>
; (ii)  (L) = o
 p
NT

as T !1, where NT denotes min1tT N t.
Assumption B4 imposes some smoothness conditions that allow us to quantify the e¤ect of using
generated variables obtained from the rst-step estimation. B4(i) assumes the bases of the sieves to
have at least one continuous derivative that are bounded above by  (L). This is a mild condition
since most sieves used in econometrics are smooth functions with at least one continuous derivative,
even for piece-wise smooth functions where di¤erentiability can be imposed at the knots; see Section
2.3 in Chen (2007) for examples. B4(ii) ensures the upper bound of the basis functions and their
derivatives does not grow too quickly over any 1=
p
NT neighborhood on SC. Note that 1=
p
NT is the
rate that max1tT
cWt  Wt converges to zero.
Theorem 4 (Uniform rates of convergence of bG). Under Assumptions B1 - B4, as NT and T
tend to innity:  bG G
1
= Op

 (L)
h
 (L)N
 1=2
T + L
 
i
,
The additive components of the convergence rate of
 bG G
1
come from two distinct sources.
The rst is the variance that comes from the rst stage estimation and the latter is the approximation
bias from using sieves. The order of the bias term is just the numerical approximation error and is
the same as that found in the nonparametric series regression literature. The convergence rate for
our variance term is inherited from the rates of the generated variables, which is parametric with
respect to NT . Our estimator has no other sampling error. This is due to the fact that, unlike in
a regression context, Wt is completely known when fqtkgK
t 1
k=1 is known hence there is no variance
component associated with regression error. The intuition for the expression  (L)N 1=2T is simple.
This term e¤ectively captures the rate of convergence of the di¤erence between the feasible and
infeasible least squares coe¢ cients of the sieve bases. In particular the di¤erence can be linearized
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and well approximated by the product between the derivatives of the basis functions and the sampling
errors of the generated variable, which are respectively bounded by  (L) and N 1=2T .
The leading term for the uniform convergence rate of bG depends on whether the sampling error
from generated variables across di¤erent markets is larger or smaller than the numerical approxima-
tion bias. If  (L)N 1=2T = o (L
 ), then the e¤ect from rst stage estimation is negligible for the
rate of convergence of the sieve estimator. If, on the other hand the reciprocal relation holds, then
the dominant term on the rate of convergence comes from the generated variables.
The uniform rate of convergence in Theorem 4 quanties the magnitude for the errors we incur
from tting a curve since the sampling error from point estimation from each market is at most
N
 1=2
T . However, the asymptotic distribution theory for a sieve estimator of an unknown function
is often di¢ cult to obtain and general results are only known to exist in some special cases. We
refer the reader to Section 3.4 of Chen (2007) for some details. The development of the distribution
theory for our estimator of G is beyond the scope of this paper.
5 Numerical Section
The rst part of this section reports a small scale simulation study to compare our estimator with
other estimators in the literature in a controlled environment. The second part illustrates our pro-
posed estimator using online betting odds data.
5.1 Monte Carlo
We rst consider the case when the data come from a single market. Here we adopt an identical
design to the one used in Section 4.3 of MGW, where they study the small sample properties of their
estimator and that of HS. In particular the consumerssearch costs are drawn independently from a
log-normal distribution with location and scale parameters set at 0:5 and 5 respectively. The other
primitives of the model are: (p; r;K) = (100; 50; 10). We solve for a mixed strategy equilibrium
and take 100 random draws from the corresponding price distribution, which can be interpreted as
observing a repeated game played by the 10 sellers 10 times. We refer the reader to MGW for the
details of the data generation procedure that is consistent with an equilibrium outcome as well as
other discussions on the Monte Carlo design.
We simulate the data according to the description above and estimate the model 1000 times.
We report the same statistics as those in MGW. We estimate the parameters using our minimum
distance estimator and are able to replicate the maximum likelihood results in MGW. We focus
our discussion on our estimator and MGWs since the latter has been shown to generally perform
19
favorably relative to the empirical likelihood estimator. The comments provided by MGW in this
regard are also applicable for our estimator and can be found in their paper. In particular our Tables
1 and 2 can be compared directly with their Tables 3(a) and 3(b) respectively. We also provide
analogous statistics associated with the estimator for the cdf of the search cost evaluated at the
cuto¤ points in Table 3.
Parameter MLE MDE
True Mean St Dev MSE Mean St Dev MSE
r (q) 50 48:384 4:276 20:896 49:535 3:112 9:900
q1 0:37 0:413 0:111 0:014 0:378 0:114 0:013
q2 0:04 0:043 0:019 0:000 0:039 0:014 0:000
q3 0:03 0:033 0:038 0:001 0:024 0:021 0:001
q4 0:03 0:025 0:046 0:002 0:021 0:028 0:001
q5 0:03 0:025 0:066 0:004 0:027 0:031 0:001
q6 0:02 0:038 0:096 0:009 0:031 0:031 0:001
q7 0:02 0:041 0:110 0:012 0:029 0:027 0:001
q8 0:02 0:050 0:131 0:018 0:025 0:024 0:001
q9 0:02 0:059 0:141 0:022 0:020 0:019 0:000
q10 0:42 0:274 0:239 0:079 0:404 0:158 0:025
Table 1: Properties of maximum likelihood (MLE) and minimum distance (MDE) estimators for
r (q) and q1; : : : ; q10.
Parameter MLE MDE
True Mean St Dev MSE Mean St Dev MSE
1 8:640 8:481 0:472 0:248 8:539 0:539 0:300
2 5:264 5:139 0:204 0:057 5:215 0:221 0:051
3 3:484 3:394 0:155 0:032 3:455 0:183 0:034
4 2:428 2:365 0:151 0:027 2:408 0:184 0:034
5 1:756 1:714 0:145 0:023 1:742 0:177 0:031
6 1:309 1:281 0:134 0:019 1:299 0:163 0:027
7 0:999 0:982 0:122 0:015 0:992 0:148 0:022
8 0:779 0:770 0:110 0:012 0:775 0:132 0:018
9 0:619 0:614 0:098 0:010 0:616 0:118 0:014
Table 2: Properties of maximum likelihood (MLE) and minimum distance (MDE) estimators for
1; : : : ;9.
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Parameter MLE MDE
True Mean St Dev MSE Mean St Dev MSE
G (1) 0:630 0:631 0:117 0:014 0:587 0:111 0:014
G (2) 0:592 0:589 0:125 0:016 0:544 0:120 0:017
G (3) 0:559 0:561 0:128 0:016 0:511 0:123 0:018
G (4) 0:531 0:544 0:138 0:019 0:486 0:131 0:019
G (5) 0:505 0:523 0:160 0:026 0:462 0:145 0:023
G (6) 0:482 0:493 0:195 0:038 0:423 0:175 0:034
G (7) 0:460 0:456 0:226 0:051 0:382 0:207 0:049
G (8) 0:440 0:413 0:252 0:064 0:332 0:226 0:063
G (9) 0:422 0:378 0:265 0:072 0:274 0:239 0:079
Table 3: Properties of maximum likelihood (MLE) and minimum distance (MDE) estimators for
G (1) ; : : : ; G (9).
Tables 1 and 2 contain the true mean and standard deviation of various parameters for each
estimator as reported in MGW,11 in addition we include the mean square errors for the ease of
comparison between our results and theirs (that include the empirical likelihood estimator). We
provide the same statistics for the estimator of the cdf evaluated at the cuto¤ points in Table
3. Our estimator performs comparably well with respect to the maximum likelihood estimator.
Particularly our estimator generally has smaller bias, but also higher variance. However, there is no
dominant estimator with respect to the mean square errors, at least for this design and sample size.
Our estimator appears to generally perform better for the parameters in Table 1. The maximum
likelihood estimation is better for those in Table 2. The results are more mixed for Table 3.
Next we consider the estimation of data that come from several markets. Here we adopt the
same design to the one used to generate results in the Supplementary Appendix that accompanies
MGSW. The data are drawn from 10 heterogeneous markets. The consumers have the same search
cost distribution in every market while sellersmarginal costs can vary and thus imply di¤erent
equilibrium price distribution. For each simulation we draw 35 prices from the equilibrium price
distribution from each market. So the total sample size is 350. Other details can be found in
MGSW.
We simulate the data and estimate the model 1000 times. We estimate our estimator using
Bernstein polynomials as the basis functions. Specically, suppose SC = [0; 1]. The basis functions
11The supporting numerical results for the consistency of the bootstrap for our estimator are available upon request.
21
that dene Bernstein polynomials of order L consists of the following L+ 1 functions:
glL (c) =
L!
l! (L  l)!c
l (1  c)L l ; l = 0; : : : ; L:
We choose Bernstein polynomials due to its well-behaved uniform property as well as the simplicity
to impose shape restrictions one expects from a cdf12. See Lorentz (1986) for further details. For a
generic support, SC =

C;C

, we can scale the support of functions in GT accordingly. We impose
monotonicity in estimating our sieve estimator in the simulation study and the application. For the
estimator of MGSW we use Hermite polynomials as the basis as done in their paper. We report
in Table 4 the integrated mean square error (imse), dened as
R
E
h bG (c) G (c)i2 dG (c), for our
estimator and theirs for the rst corresponding 10 basis terms.
L SLSE SNMLE
imse (10 2)
1 0:345 6:984
2 0:126 1:596
3 0:120 0:389
4 0:117 0:513
5 0:122 0:430
6 0:126 0:258
7 0:127 0:302
8 0:125 0:300
9 0:123 0:193
10 0:121 0:259
Table 4: Imse for sieve least squares (SLSE) and semi-nonparametric maxmimum likelihood
(SNMLE) estimators using L basis functions.
We note that it would not be appropriate to compare our reported statistics and Table 1 of
MGSW. In particular the imse we use is di¤erent to their integrated squared error. There are two
12For any continuous function g:
lim
L!1
LX
l=0
g

l
L

L!
l! (L  l)!c
l (1  c)L l = g (c) ;
holds uniformly on [0; 1]. Furthermore for GT =

g : g = gL>b for some b = (b0; : : : ; bL)
	
, elements in GT will be
non-decreasing under the restrictions that bl  bl+1 for l = 0; : : : ; L, and the range of functions in GT can be set by
choosing b0 and bL to be the minimum and the maximum values respectively.
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Figure 1: Sieve estimator of the cost cdf with L = 4.
di¤erences. First, their integrated error is calculated by integrating the squared error between the
Monte Carlo average of bG and the true. Second, their integrator is the identity function and ours is
G; i.e. we use
R
[] dG (c) rather than R [] dc.
We nd that our estimator seems to perform slightly better with respect to the imse criterion for
the number of polynomial terms considered. We certainly do not claim our estimator is necessarily
better based on Table 4. It is generally di¢ cult to compare any two estimators in nite sample, and
in particular for nonparametric estimators using di¤erent basis functions. Note that Table 4 suggests
the imse is minimized for our estimator when L = 4 and theirs when L = 9. As a visual illustration,
we also plot the mean and the 5th and 95th percentiles of our estimator and theirs. Figures 1 and 2
represent our estimator with L = 4 and L = 9 respectively. Figures 3 and 4 correspond to MGSW
counterparts.
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Figure 2: Sieve estimator of the cost cdf with L = 9.
Figure 3: MGSWs estimator of the cost cdf with L = 4.
Figure 4: MGSW estimator of the cost cdf with L = 9.
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5.2 Empirical Illustration
Background and Data
Gambling in the UK is regulated by the Gambling Commission on behalf of the governments
Department for Culture, Media and Sport under the Gambling Act 2005. In addition to the moral
duty to prevent the participation of children and the general policing against criminal activities
related to gambling in the UK, another main goal of the Act is to ensure that gambling is conducted
in a fair and open way. One crucial component of the Act that has received much attention in the
media takes place in September 2007, which permits gambling operators to advertise more widely.13
Its intention is to raise the awareness for the general public about potential bookmakers in the market
in order to increase the competition between them.
In this section we illustrate the use of our estimators proposed in earlier parts of the paper. We
assume the search model described in Section 2 serves as a (very) crude approximation of the true
mechanism that generates the prices that we see in the data.14 We focus on the booking odds set
at di¤erent bookmakers for the top two professional football leagues in the UK, namely the Premier
League and the League Championship, for the 2006/7 and 2007/8 seasons. We consider the odds
for what is known as a 2x1 bet, where there are three possible outcomes for a given match: home
(team) wins, away wins or they draw. We construct the price for each bookmaker from the odds we
observe. Since the odd for each event is the inverse of its perceived probability, we dene our price
from each bookmaker as: 1/(home-win odd) + 1/(draw odd) + 1/(away-win odd). The sum of theses
probabilities always exceeds 1 since consumers never get to play a fair game. This excess probability
represents what is called the bookmakers overround. The higher the overround, the more unfair and
expensive is the bookmakers price.
We obtain the data from http://www.oddsportal.com/, which is an open website that collects
13Gambling operators have been able to advertise on TV and radio from 1st of September 2007. Previ-
ously the rules for advertising for all types of gambling companies, including casinos and betting shops have
been highly regulated. Traditional outlets for advertising are through magazines and newspapers, or other
means to get public attention such as sponsoring major sporting events. Further information on the back-
ground and impact of the Gambling Act 2005 can be found in the review produced by the Committees of Ad-
vertising Practice at the request by the Department for Culture, Media and Sport, http://www.cap.org.uk/News-
reports/~/media/Files/CAP/Reports%20and%20surveys/CAP%20and%20BCAP%20Gambling%20Review.ashx
14We highlight three underlying assumptions of the theoretical model. First, products are homogeneous. Second,
consumers perform a non-sequential search. Third, each consumer purchases only one unit of the product. In the
context of betting it is not unreasonable to assume products are homogeneous as consumers are only interested in
making monetary prot. Our prices are based on online odds therefore non-sequential search strategy may also provide
a reasonable approximation of consumersbehavior who conduct search online. However, assuming each consumer
only purchases one unit, in this case translating to everyone having the same wager, is not realistic; also experienced
and organized bettors often bet on multiple matches at the same time.
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data from the main online bookmakers from a number of di¤erent events. In the tables and gures
below, we use PL and LC to respectively denote Premier League and League Championship, and
06/07 and 07/08 respectively for the 2006/7 and 2007/8 seasons. We begin with Table 5 that gives
some summary statistics on the data.
Group Matches Bookmakers Overrounds
Mean Median St Dev Mean Median St Dev
PL 06/07 380 21:58 22 2:93 9:55 9:90 2:09
PL 07/08 380 35:24 36 2:25 8:45 8:48 2:36
LC 06/07 557 20:62 21 2:19 11:13 11:14 1:09
LC 07/08 557 28:10 29 3:59 10:36 10:71 2:02
Table 5: Summary statistics on the data from di¤erent leagues and seasons.
We partition the data into four product groups. One for each league and season. The numbers
of bookmakers we observe vary between matches as occasionally odds for some bookmakers have not
been collected. The average overrounds between the two seasons indicate that prices have fallen after
the change of law. Relatedly, we also see an increase in the average number of bookmakers as well.15
For each group we take the number of sellers to be the average number of bookmakers (rounded
to the nearest integer). We treat the observed price for every match as a random draw from an
equilibrium price distribution. We assume the distribution of the consumerssearch cost to be the
same for both leagues within each season. Our main interest is to see if there is any evidence the
distribution of the search costs di¤er between the two seasons.
Single Market
We provide four sets of point estimates. One for each group using the estimator described in
Section 3. For the following tables, the bootstrap standard errors are reported in parentheses.
15The total number of bookmakers for the 2006/7 season is 32, and for the 2007/8 season is 40.
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Group K bq1 bq2 bqK r(bq) p p
PL 06/07 23 0:77 0:21 0:01 80:36 100:09 118:99
(0:03) (0:02) (0:00) (2:20)
PL 07/08 36 0:40 0:55 0:05 96:40 100:04 125:62
(0:10) (0:08) (0:00) (1:13)
LC 06/07 22 0:67 0:30 0:03 97:51 105:03 118:04
(0:10) (0:08) (0:00) (4:78)
LC 07/08 29 0:20 0:73 0:07 97:87 101:23 159:30
(0:11) (0:10) (0:01) (0:98)
Table 6: Estimates of search proportions, selling costs and range of prices
Over 90% of consumers search at most twice for every product group. Other proportions of con-
sumerssearch that are not reported are very close to zero. It is very noticeable that the proportions
of consumers searching just once drop, following the law change, transferring mostly to searching
twice. We now relate these to the search cost distribution.
Group K b1 bG(1) b2 bG (2) bK 1 bG(K 1)
PL 06/07 23 2:49 0:23 1:24 0:01 0:07 0:01
(0:05) (0:02) (0:02) (0:00) (0:00) (0:00)
PL 07/08 36 3:17 0:60 1:26 0:05 0:03 0:05
(0:40) (0:09) (0:10) (0:01) (0:00) (0:01)
LC 06/07 22 1:72 0:33 0:83 0:03 0:05 0:03
(0:08) (0:08) (0:08) (0:01) (0:01) (0:01)
LC 07/08 29 6:07 0:80 1:98 0:07 0:04 0:07
(1:18) (0:12) (0:24) (0:01) (0:00) (0:01)
Table 7: Estimates of search cost distribution
We do not report the estimated cdf values for other cut-o¤ points since they are almost identical
to bG (2) and bG (K 1). Since the cut-o¤ values for each group di¤er, it is more convenient to make
this comparison graphically. We next estimate the cdf as a function.
Pooling Data Across Markets
We combine the data between the two leagues for each time period using the sieve estimator
proposed in Section 4. We use Bernstein polynomials as the base functions for our sieve estimator;
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Figure 5: Scatter plots of the point estimates of cost quantiles for the two football leagues, and the
corresponding sieve estimates of the cost cdf using data from the 2006/7 season.
Figure 6: Scatter plots of the point estimates of cost quantiles for the two football leagues, and the
corresponding sieve estimates of the cost cdf using data from the 2007/8 season.
see the description above. To construct our estimates for the cdfs we only impose monotonicity on
the coe¢ cients to ensure the estimates are non-decreasing. We t the data using L = 4.
Figures 5 and 6 illustrate how sieve estimation interpolates data across markets. They provide
scatter plots of the point estimates of quantiles for the two leagues and the corresponding sieve
estimates for the 2006/7 and 2007/8 seasons respectively. Figure 7 plots the two curves together. We
see that the estimate from the 2007/8 season takes higher value than the cdf from the 2006/7 season
almost uniformly where their supports overlap. This display of a rst order stochastic dominance
behavior indicates the cost of search has fallen since the implementation of the new advertising law.
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Figure 7: Sieve estimates of the cost cdf using data from the 2006/7 and 2007/8 seasons.
6 Conclusion
We propose a minimum distance estimator to estimate quantiles of search cost distribution when
only the price distribution is available. We derive the distribution theory of our estimator and show
it can be consistently bootstrapped. It is easier to estimate and perform inference with our estimator
than previous methods. Our point estimator can be readily used to estimate the cdf of the search
cost by the method of sieve. We provide the uniform convergence rate for our sieve estimator. The
rate can be used to quantify the errors from interpolating quantiles across markets when such data
are available. Both our estimators perform reasonably well relatively to other existing estimators in
a simulation study with small sample. We also illustrate the ease of use for our estimators with real
world data. We use online odds to construct bookmakersprices for online betting for professional
football matches in the UK for the two seasons either side of the change in the advertising law that
allows gambling operators to advertise more freely. This particular change in the law marks a well-
known event that has since been reported to increase competition amongst bookmakers by several
measures, as intended by the Gambling Act 2005. One aspect of this outcome is supported by our
simple model of search that suggests that consumers search more often, which can be attributed
at least partly to the reduction of search costs. We expect the minimum distance approach in this
paper can be adapted to o¤er a computationally appealing way to estimate more complicated search
models.
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Appendix
Preliminary Notations
The proofs of our Theorems make use of some results from empirical processes theory. We do not
dene basic terms and denitions from empirical processes theory here for brevity. We refer the
reader to the book by Kosorok (2008) for such details.
Firstly, with an abuse of notation, it will be convenient to introduce a functionm (; ; ) : SP ! R
that depends respectively on nite and innite dimensional parameters  2  and  2  . Recall
that  = [0; 1]K 1. Here we use   to denote a set of all cdfs with bounded densities dened on SP .
So that for p 2 SP ,  2  and  2  , we dene:
m (p; ; ) = 1
  
p  p K   K 1X
k=1
(k  K) k
!!
 
0@ K 1 PK 1k=1 k (1   (p))K 1
+
PK 1
k=1 k (1   (p))k 1
1A (p  p) 1    p  p K   K 1X
k=1
(k  K) k
!!
:
Comparing the above to the function m (; ) used in the main text (see e.g. (8)), we have that
m (; ) and m (; ; F ) are precisely the same objects.
We denote a space of bounded functions dened on SP equipped with the sup-norm by D. We
view m (; ; ) as an element in D, which is parameterized by (; ) 2  . Also since  is dened
in m (p; ; ) pointwise for each p, it will be useful in the proofs below for us to occasionally write
m (p; ;  (p))  m (p; ; ) in dening some derivatives for clarity. In particular, pointwise for each
p, using an ordinary derivative, for any  let: Dm (p; ;  (p))  limt!0
m(p;;(p)+t) m(p;;(p))t  and
D
@
@k
m (p; ;  (p))  limt!0
 @@km(p;;(p)+t)  @@km(p;;(p))t  for all k. It is easy to see that m (; ; ),
@
@k
m (; ; ), Dm (; ; ) and D @@km (; ; ) are elements in D for any (; ) in    . In the
main text we have denoted the sup-norm for any real value function dened on SC by jj1. In
this Appendix we will also use jj1 to denote the sup-norm for any real value function dened on
SP as well. We do not index the norm further to avoid additional notation. There should be no
ambiguity whether the domain for the function under consideration is SP or SC . We dene the
following constants that will be helpful in guiding the reader through our proofs:
m = sup
(;)2 
jm (; ;  ())j1 ;  @@m = max1kK sup(;)2 
 @@km (; ;  ())

1
;
DFm = sup
(;)2 
jDFm (; ;  ())j1 ; DF @@m = max1kK sup(;)2 
DF @@km (; ;  ())

1
:
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Other generic positive and nite constants that do not depend on the sample size are denoted by 0,
which can take di¤erent values in di¤erent places.
Lemmas
Lemmas 1 - 8 are used to prove Theorems 1 - 3 from Section 3. Lemmas 9 - 17 are used to prove
Theorem 4 from Section 4.
Lemma 1. Under Assumptions A2(i) and A2(ii), M () has a well-separated minimum at 0.
Proof of Lemma 1. Under A2(i) and the domination condition in A2(ii), M has a unique
minimum at 0. Since M is continuous on , the minimum is well-separated.
Lemma 2. Under Assumptions A2(i) and A2(ii), sup2 jMN () M ()j a:s:! 0.
Proof of Lemma 2.
MN () M ()
=
Z
m (p; ; FN)
2 (N (dp)   (dp)) +
Z
m (p; ; FN)
2  m (p; ; F )2 d
= I1 () + I2 () :
For I1 (), using the bound for m, jI1 ()j  2m
R
(N (dp)   (dp)). The convergence of measure
follows from A2(ii) so that sup2 jI1 ()j a:s:! 0. For I2 (), we have
jI2 ()j  2m
Z
jm (p; ; FN) m (p; ; F )j (dp)
 2mDFm
Z
 (dp) jFN   F j1 :
The second inequality follows from taking pointwise mean value expansion about F . Then sup2 jI2 ()j a:s:!
0 by Glivenko-Cantelli theorem. The proof then follows from the triangle inequality.
Let
H () =
Z
2
@
@
m (p; ; F )
@
@
>m (p; ; F ) (dp) ;
HN () =
Z
2
@
@
m (p; ; FN)
@
@
>m (p; ; FN)N (dp) ;
HN () =
Z
2
@
@
m (p; ; F N)
@
@
>m (p; ; F

N)

N (dp) ;
where F N is the empirical cdf with respect to the bootstrap sample.
Lemma 3. Under Assumption A2(ii), for any N such that kN   0k a:s:! 0 then kHN(N) H (0)k a:s:!
0.
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Proof of Lemma 3. First show sup2 kHN() H ()k a:s:! 0. Using the same strategy in the
proof of Lemma 2, let h (p; ; ) = 2 @
@
m (p; ; ) @
@
>m (p; ; ), we have:
HN () H ()
=
Z
h (p; ; FN)N (dp) 
Z
h (p; ; F ) (dp)
=
Z
h (p; ; FN) (N (dp)   (dp)) +
Z
h (p; ; FN)  h (p; ; F ) (dp)
= J1 () + J2 () :
Then sup2 kJ1 ()k  02@
@
m
R
(N (dp)   (dp)) a:s:! 0, and sup2 kJ2 ()k  02DF @@m
R
 (dp) jFN   F j1 a:s:!
0. Uniform almost sure convergence then follows from the triangle inequality.
By the continuity of H () and Slutzkys theorem, jH(N) H (0)j a:s:! 0.
The desired result holds by using the triangle inequality to bound HN(b)   H (0) = HN(b)  
H(b) +H(b) H ().
Lemma 4. Under Assumption A2(ii), @
@
MN (0)
d! N (0;).
Proof of Lemma 4. From its denition, @
@
MN (0) = 2
R
@
@
m (p; 0; FN)m (p; 0; FN)N (dp),
by adding nulls we have
p
N
@
@
MN (0)
= 2
Z
@
@
m (p; 0; F )
p
Nm (p; 0; FN) (dp)
+2
Z 
@
@
m (p; 0; FN)  @
@
m (p; 0; F )
p
Nm (p; 0; FN) (dp)
+2
Z
@
@
m (p; 0; F )
p
Nm (p; 0; FN) (N (dp)   (dp))
+2
Z 
@
@
m (p; 0; FN)  @
@
m (p; 0; F )
p
Nm (p; 0; FN) (N (dp)   (dp))
= J1 + J2 + J3 + J4:
We rst show the desired distribution theory is delivered by J1.
By Donskerstheorem the empirical cdf converges weakly to a standard Brownian bridge of F ,
denoted by (B (F (p)))p2SP . So that for p; p
0 2 SP ,
B (F (p))  N (0; F (p) (1  F (p))) , and (16)
Cov (B (F (p)) ;B (F (p0))) = F (min fp; p0g)  F (p)F (p0) :
In this proof, it will be convenient to dene my (; ) = m (; 0; ) as an element in D indexed by just
32
. Next we calculate the directional derivative of my at F in the direction , which gives for all p:
lim
t!0
my (p; F (p) + t (p)) my (p; F (p))t    (p)  (p)
 = 0; where (17)
 (p) =
 
(K   1)K
 
1 
K 1X
k=1
k
!
(1  F (p))K 2 +
K 1X
k=2
(k   1) k (1  F (p))k 2
!

 
(p  p) 1  
 
p  p K   K 1X
k=1
(k  K) k
!!
:
It is clear that  is an element in D, andmy is Hadamard di¤erentiable at F . Consequently the linear
functional  7! 2 R @
@
m (p; 0; F )m
y (p; ) (dp) is also Hadamard di¤erentiable at F . In particular
its derivative is represented by a linear operator, which we denote by TF :
TF : D ! R such that for any , (18)
TF  = 2
Z
 (p)  (p) (dp) , where
 (p) =
@
@
m (p; 0; F )  (p) for all p 2 SP :
Hence we can apply the functional delta method and the continuous mapping theorem by letting
 =
p
N (FN   F ):
2
Z
@
@
m (p; 0; F )
p
Nmy (p; FN) (dp) (19)
= 2
Z
 (p)
p
N (FN (p)  F (p)) (dp) + op (1)
d! 2
Z
 (p)B (F (p)) (dp) .
It remains to show that kJjk p! 0 for j = 2; 3; 4. We will repeatedly use the fact that any linear
functional of
p
Nmy (; FN) is asymptotically tight and is therefore also bounded in probability.
Consider the k th component of J2, (J2)k:
j(J2)kj  2
Z 
@
@k
m (p; 0; FN)  @
@k
m (p; 0; F )
2
 (dp)
Z p
Nm (p; 0; FN)
2
 (dp)
 02DF @@m
Z
 (dp) jFN   F j21
Z p
Nmy (p; FN)
2
 (dp) ;
where we rst use Cauchy Schwarz inequality, then we take a pointwise mean value expansion at
@
@k
m (p; 0; F ). Then remaining integrals in the second inequality are bounded and j(J2)kj
p! 0 since
jFN   F j21
p! 0.
For J3, take out the upper bounds of the integrand:
j(J3)kj  0 @@m supp2SP
pNmy (p; FN) Z (N (dp)   (dp)) :
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Since the supremum is a linear functional, we have supp2SP
pNmy (p; FN) = Op (1). Then by A2(ii)R
(N (dp)   (dp)) p! 0, and j(J3)kj
p! 0.
For J4, applying similar arguments to J2 and J3, we have
j(J4)kj  0DF @@m jFN   F j1
Z p
Nmy (p; FN) (dp)
Z
(N (dp)   (dp)) :
So that j(J4)kj
p! 0 since R pNmy (p; FN) (dp) = Op (1) and jFN   F j1 R (N (dp)   (dp)) p! 0.
Lemma 5. Under Assumptions A2(i), A2(ii) and A3, sup2 jMN () M ()j a:s:
! 0 for almost
all samples fPigNi=1.
Proof of Lemma 5. Write
MN () M () = MN () MN () +MN () M () :
From Lemma 2, sup2 jMN () M ()j a:s:! 0. Next,
MN () MN () =
Z
m (p; ; F N)
2 (N (dp)  N (dp)) +
Z
m (p; ; F N)
2  m (p; ; FN)2 dN
= I1 () + I

2 () :
We can use analogous arguments made in the proof of Lemma 2 to show sup2 jMN () MN ()j a:s:
!
0. The result then follows from an application of the triangle inequality.
Lemma 6. Under Assumptions A2(i), A2(ii) and A3, b a:s:! 0 for almost all samples fPigNi=1.
Proof of Lemma 6. Follows immediately from Lemmas 1 and 5.
Lemma 7. Under Assumptions A2(i), A2(ii) and A3, for any N such that kN   0k a:s:
! 0,
kHN(N) H (0)k a:s:
! 0 for almost all samples fPigNi=1.
Proof of Lemma 7. The same argument used in Lemma 3 can be applied to show that
sup2 kHN() HN ()k a:s:
! 0 by replacing the quantities dened using the original data by the
bootstrap sample, and the limiting (population) objects by the sample counterparts using the original
data. Then the triangle inequality we have:
kHN(N) H (0)k  sup
2
kHN() HN ()k+ kHN(N) H (0)k :
Then by Lemma 3 kHN(N) H (0)k a:s:
! 0.
Lemma 8. Under Assumptions A2(i), A2(ii) and A3,
p
N
 
@
@
MN (0)  @@MN (0)

converges in
distribution to N (0;) under P conditionally given fPigNi=1
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Proof of Lemma 8. For notational simplicity we set N and N to be equal to  for all N ,
otherwise the proof can be extended in the same manner as done in Lemma 4 with more algebra.
Then
p
N
@
@
MN (0) 
p
N
@
@
MN (0)
= 2
Z
@
@
m (p; 0; F )
p
N (m (p; 0; F

N) m (p; 0; FN)) (dp)
+2
Z 
@
@
m (p; 0; FN)  @
@
m (p; 0; F )
p
N (m (p; 0; F

N) m (p; 0; FN)) (dp)
+2
Z 
@
@
m (p; 0; F

N) 
@
@
m (p; 0; FN)
p
Nm (p; 0; FN) (dp)
+2
Z 
@
@
m (p; 0; F

N) 
@
@
m (p; 0; FN)
p
N (m (p; 0; F

N) m (p; 0; F N)) (dp)
= J1 + J

2 + J

3 + J

4 :
From Giné and Zinn (1990) we know the empirical distribution can be bootstrapped. So thatp
N (F N   FN) has the same distribution as
p
N (FN   F ) asymptotically, and similarly for their
corresponding linear functionals. Thus J1 gives the desired distribution theory in the limit.
For the other terms, rst consider J2 . Take the k th component of J2 and apply Cauchy Schwarz
inequality:
j(J2 )kj  2
Z 
@
@k
m (p; 0; FN)  @
@k
m (p; 0; F )
2
 (dp)
Z p
N (m (p; 0; F

N) m (p; 0; FN))
2
 (dp)
 02DF @@m
Z
 (dp) jFN   F j21
Z p
N (m (p; 0; F

N) m (p; 0; FN))
2
 (dp) :
So j(J2 )kj
p! 0 since jFN   F j21
p! 0 and R pN (m (p; 0; F N) m (p; 0; FN))2  (dp) is asymp-
totically tight under P.
By an analogous reasoning, it is straightforward to show that kJ3k p
! 0 and kJ4k p
! 0.
The proof then follows from the triangle inequality.
We dene the following objects for the remaining lemmas. Let: bQT = bg>bg=T , QT = g>g=T
and Q = E [QT ]; b1T = 1[( bQT ) > 0] and 1T = 1 [ (QT ) > 0]; kkF denote the Frobenius norm for
matrices, so that for any matrix A, kAkF = tr
 
A>A
1=2
where tr () is the trace operator. Note that
kxk = kxkF for any column vector x.
Lemma 9. Under Assumptions B1, max1tT
cWt  Wt = Op  1=pNT .
Proof of Lemma 9. Under B1, the implications of Theorem 2 and Corollary 2 hold for all
markets. Therefore for all t,
cWt  Wt = Op 1=pN t, and the proof follows since N t  NT .
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Lemma 10. Under Assumptions B1 - B3, kQT  Qk2F = op (1).
Proof of Lemma 10. For this it is su¢ cient to show E
kQT  Qk2F  = o (1). First we write:
QT =
1
T
TX
t=1
gt>gt; where
gt =
 
gL
 
t1

; : : : ; gL
 
tKt 1
>
:
Under B2

gt>gt
	T
t=1
is an i.i.d. sequence of squared matrices of size L. Therefore E [QT ] = Q does
not depend on T . Since kQT  Qk2F is the sum of the squared of every element in QT  Q, we have:
E
kQT  Qk2F  = LX
l;l0=1
E [(QT  Q)ll0 ]2
=
LX
l;l0=1
Var
 
1
T
TX
t=1
 
gt>gt

ll0
!
=
1
T
LX
l;l0=1
Var
0@ KX
K=2
K 1X
k=1
glL
 
tk

gl0L
 
tk

1

Kt = K
1A :
The variance term can be bounded by using the law of total variance and, since K < 1, applying
Cauchy Schwarz inequality together with B3(ii) repeatedly, so that
Var
0@ KX
K=2
K 1X
k=1
glL
 
tk

gl0L
 
tk

1

Kt = K
1A
 E
24Var
0@ KX
K=2
K 1X
k=1
glL
 
tk

gl0L
 
tk
Kt = K
1A35
 0 (L)4 :
Therefore E
kQT  Qk2F   0 (L)4 L2=T . By B3(ii) E kQT  Qk2F  = o (1), which implies
kQT  Qk2F = op (1).
Lemma 11. Under Assumptions B1 - B3, 1T = 1 + op (1).
Proof of Lemma 11. Since j (QT  Q)j  kQT  QkF , as the latter is the square root of the
sum of all squared eigenvalues of QT   Q, we also have  (QT  Q) = op (1) by Lemma 10. By the
implication of B3(i),  (Q) > 0 therefore limT!1 Pr [ (QT ) > 0] = 1 which completes the proof.
Lemma 12. Under Assumptions B1 - B3,
1T (e   L) = Op (L ).
Proof of Lemma 12. First write 1T (e   L) = 1T  g>g  g> (y   gL). By Lemma 11, we
have with probability approaching one (w.p.a. 1), 1T
 
g>g
 
= 1TQ
 1
T =T therefore,1T  g>g  g> (y   gL)  1TQ 1T g>=pT(y   gL) =pT :
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Next we show that
1TQ 1T g>=pT = Op (1). Since  (1TQT ) is bounded away from zero w.p.a. 1,
as seen from the previous lemma, we have that 
 
1TQ
 1
T

is bounded from above w.p.a. 1. Then we
have:
1TQ 1T g>=pT2 =   1TQ 1T g>gQ 1T =T =   1TQ 1T  = Op (1), so that 1TQ 1T g>=pT =
Op (1). Note that y can be written as a vector of fG (tk)gK
t;T
k=1;t=1, see equation (14). Then using
B3(iii), we have
(y   gL) =pT2 = 1T
TX
t=1
Kt 1X
k=1

G
 
tk
  gL  tk> L2
 L 2  K   1K=2:
So that
(y   gL) =pT = O (L ), which completes the proof.
Lemma 13. Under Assumptions B1 - B4,
(by   y) =pT = Op  1=pNT .
Proof of Lemma 13. Recall that by is a vector of fbqtkgKt;Tk=1;t=1, so that
(by   y) =pT2 = 1
T
TX
t=1
Kt 1X
k=1
 
kX
k0=1
 
qtk0   bqtk0
!2
:
The proof is an immediate consequence of Lemma 9 since we have:
PKt 1
k=1
Pk
k0=1 (q
t
k0   bqtk0)2 =
Op (1=NT ) for all t.
Lemma 14. Under Assumptions B1 - B4,
(bg   g) =pT = Op   (L) =pNT .
Proof of Lemma 14. Recall that bg is a matrix of ngiL(btk)oKt;T
k=1;t=1
. From Assumption B4(i),
we can take a mean value expansion so that for any t; k
giL(btk)  giL(tk)   (L) btk  tk, which
is Op
 
 (L) =
p
NT

by Lemma 9. The proof then follows by the same argument as used in Lemma
13.
Lemma 15. Under Assumptions B1 - B4,
 bQT  QT = Op   (L) =pNT .
Proof of Lemma 15. Since bg>bg   g>g = 2 (bg   g) >g + (bg   g) > (bg   g), we have bQT  QT  2 (bg   g) >g=T+ (bg   g) > (bg   g) =T :
We can bound
(bg   g) >g=T by:(bg   g) >g=T  (bg   g) =pTg=pT
= Op

 (L) =
p
NT

;
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as we have shown
(bg   g) =pT = Op   (L) =pNT  in Lemma 14 and using the fact that g=pT2 =
 (QT ) = Op (1). The latter follows from Lemma 10, which implies
 (QT  Q)  kQT  QkF =
op (1), together with B3(i) they ensure  (QT ) is bounded w.p.a.1. Also, by Lemma 14
(bg   g) > (bg   g) =T =
op
 
 (L) =
p
NT

since
(bg   g) > (bg   g) =T = (bg   g) =pT2 = Op   (L)2 =NT  which is op   (L) =pNT 
by B4(ii).
Lemma 16. Under Assumptions B1 - B4, b1T = 1 + op (1).
Proof of Lemma 16. From Lemma 14, b1T = 1T + op (1). The proof then follows from Lemma
11.
Lemma 17. Under Assumptions B1 - B4,
 bg>by   g>y =pT = Op   (L) =pNT .
Proof of Lemma 17. We begin by writing: bg>by g>y = (bg   g) >y+g> (by   y)+(bg   g) > (by   y).
We can bound (bg   g) >y=T by:(bg   g) >y=T  (bg   g) =pTy=pT
= Op

 (L) =
p
NT

;
as we have
(bg   g) =pT = Op   (L) =pNT  from Lemma 14 and y=pT = Op (1). The latter
holds since
y=pT2 = 1T PTt=1PKt 1k=1 1 Pkk0=1 qtk02  K  K   1 =2 < 1. The same line of
arguments can be used to show that g> (by   y) =T = Op   (L) =pNT  and (bg   g) > (by   y) =T =
op
 
 (L) =
p
NT

.
Proofs of Theorems
Our proofs of Theorems 1 and 2 follow standard steps for an M-estimator (e.g. see van der Vaart
(2000)). The proof of Theorem 3 follows the approach of Arcones and Giné (1992). We employ a
similar strategy used in Newey (1997) to prove Theorem 4.
Proof of Theorem 1. Immediately holds from Lemmas 1 and 2, following the standard
conditions for consistency of an M-estimator.
Proof of Theorem 2. Our estimator satises the following rst order condition, 0 = @
@
MN
b.
Applying a mean value expansion,
0 =
@
@
MN (0) +HN
eb   0
=
@
@
MN (0) +H (0)
b   0+ op b   0 ;
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where e denotes some intermediate value between b and 0, and the second equality follows from
Lemma 3 and Theorem 1. Assumption A2(iii) ensures H  H (0) is invertible, by re-arranging and
multiplying by
p
N , we have
p
N
b   0 = H 1pN @
@
MN (0)

+ op (1) :
The result then follows from applying Cramér theorem to Lemma 4.
Proof of Theorem 3. Similar to the proof of Theorem 2, our bootstrap estimator satises
the following rst order condition,
0 =
@
@
MN (0) +H

N
eb   0
=
@
@
MN (0) +H
b   0+ op b   0 :
where e denotes some intermediate value between b and 0, and the second equality follows from
Lemmas 6 and Lemma 7. Using A2(iii), we have
p
N
b   0 = H 1pN @
@
MN (0)

+ op (1) :
Take the di¤erence between
p
N
b   0 and pN b   0 (from the last equation in the previous
proof), we have
p
N
b   b = H 1pN @
@
MN (0) 
p
N
@
@
MN (0)

+ op (1) :
The proof is completed by applying Cramér theorem to Lemma 8.
Proof of Theorem 4. For each c, we decompose:
bG (c) G (c) = bG (c)  eG (c) + eG (c) G (c) :
First consider eG (c) G (c), which can be decomposed further into gL (c)> e   L+gL (c)> L  G (c).
These terms are similar to the components of a series estimator of a regression function. We have,1T  eG G1   (L)1T (e   L)+O  L 
= Op
 
 (L)L 

:
The rate above follows from Lemma 12 and Assumption B3(iii). And from Lemma 11, we have
1  1T = op (1), therefore: eG G
1
=
1T  eG G1 + op  eG G1
= Op
 
 (L)L 

:
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Next consider bG (c)  eG (c), which accounts for the generated variables. We focus on b1T1T  bG (c)  eG (c).
In particular Lemmas 11 and 16 ensure that Q 1T and bQ 1T exist w.p.a. 1, and we haveb1T1T  bG (c)  eG (c) = b1T1TgL (c)>  bQ 1T bg>by=T  Q 1T g>y=T :
We now show that b1T1T  bQ 1T bg>by=T  Q 1T g>y=T = Op   (L) =pNT . To see this, consider:
b1T1T  bQ 1T bg>by=T  Q 1T g>y=T = b1T1TQ 1T  bg>by   g>y =T
+b1T1T  bQ 1T  Q 1T g>y=T
+b1T1T  bQ 1T  Q 1T   bg>by   g>y =T:
Lemma 10 ensures that bQ 1T and Q 1T converge in probability to Q 1, which is known to be bounded
by assumption B3(i). Therefore, using Lemma 17,
b1T1TQ 1T  bg>by   g>y =T = Q 1  bg>by   g>y =T + op   bg>by   g>y =T
= Op

 (L) =
p
NT

:
Note we can write b1T1T  bQ 1T  Q 1T  = b1T1T bQ 1T QT   bQTQ 1T . Then, in addition to the above,
by Lemma 15:
b1T1T  bQ 1T  Q 1T  = Op   (L) =pNT . We also have g>y=T  g=pTy=pT,
which we know is bounded in probability since both
g=pT and y=pT are Op (1) (we have shown
these in the proofs of Lemmas 15 and 17 respectively). Hence,b1T1T  bQ 1T  Q 1T g>y=T  b1T1T  bQ 1T  Q 1T g>y=T
= Op

 (L) =
p
NT

:
Lastly, under B4(ii), we haveb1T1T  bQ 1T  Q 1T   bg>by   g>y =T  b1T1T  bQ 1T  Q 1T  bg>by   g>y =T
= op

 (L) =
p
NT

:
Therefore we have
b1T1T  bG  eG1 = Op  2 (L) =pNT , and by Lemmas 11 and 16 we knowb1T1T = 1 + op (1), so that bG  eG
1
=
b1T1T  bG  eG1 + op  bG  eG1
= Op

2 (L) =
p
NT

:
Then
 bG G
1
can be bounded by using the triangle inequality, which completes the proof.
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Asymptotic Variances for Corollaries 1, 2 and 3
We take the asymptotic distribution of
p
N
b   0 derived in Theorem 2 as the starting point.
The asymptotic variances for the estimators described in Corollaries 1, 2 and 3 can be obtained
using the delta-method. In particular, given that
p
N
b   0 d! N (0; H 1H 1) and 0 belongs
to the interior of   [0; 1]K 1, then for any l vector value function x : ! Rl that is continuously
di¤erentiable at 0:
p
N

x(b)  x (0) d! N  0; D>xH 1H 1Dx whereD>x is the Jacobian matrix, 
D>x

ij
= @
@qj
xi (q). We provide D>x for the three cases below.
Corollary 1. For bK , x (0) = 1 PK 1k=1 qk. Here D>x is simply ( 1; : : : ; 1).
Corollary 2. For b, xi (0) = R 1z=0w (z; q) [(i+ 1) z   1] (1  z)i 1 dz for i = 1; : : : ; K   1.
Using equations (3) and (12), and substituting in qK = 1 
PK
k=1 qk, we can write
w (z; q) = ps (z; q)  s (z; q) r (q) + r (q) ; where
s (z; q) =
q1PK
k=1 kqk (1  z)k 1
=
q1
K (1  z)K 1 +PK 1k=1 qk k (1  z)k 1  K (1  z)K 1 ;
r (q) = p 
 
p  p q1PK
k=2 kqk
= p 
 
p  p q1
K (1  q1) +
PK
k=2 (k  K) qk
:
The integrand dened in xi is continuously di¤erentiable at any q that lies in the interior of  for
all z. Therefore we can di¤erentiate under the integral sign. In particular,
@xi (0)
@qj
=
Z 1
z=0
@w (z; q)
@qj
[(i+ 1) z   1] (1  z)i 1 dz; where
@w (z; q)
@qj
= (p  r (q)) @
@qj
s (z; q) + (1  s (z; q)) @
@qj
r (q) ;
and
@
@qj
s (z; q)
=
8><>:
1
K(1 z)K 1+PK 1k=1 qk(k(1 z)k 1 K(1 z)K 1)  
q1((1 z) K(1 z)K 1)
(K(1 z)K 1+
PK 1
k=1 qk(k(1 z)k 1 K(1 z)K 1))
2
 q1(j(1 z)j 1 K(1 z)K 1)
(K(1 z)K 1+
PK 1
k=1 qk(k(1 z)k 1 K(1 z)K 1))
2
for j = 1
for j > 1
;
@
@qj
r (q) =
8><>:
  (p p)
K(1 q1)+
PK
k=2(k K)qk
  K(p p)q1
(K(1 q1)+
PK
k=2(k K)qk)
2
(j K)(p p)q1
(K(1 q1)+
PK
k=2(k K)qk)
2
for j = 1
for j > 1
:
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Corollary 3. For bG, xi (0) = 1 Pik=1 qk for i = 1; : : : ; K 1. Here D>T is the following lower
triangular matrix consisting of  1s, i.e.
D>T =
0BBBBBBBB@
 1 0    0 0
 1  1 . . . 0
...
. . .
...
 1 . . .  1 0
 1  1     1  1
1CCCCCCCCA
:
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